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SHENKER v. LAUREATE EDUCATION, INC.: WHERE 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS EXERCISE NON-MANAGERIAL 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES BEYOND THOSE ENUMERATED IN 
SECTION 2-405.1(a) OF THE CORPORATIONS AND 
ASSOCIA TIONS ARTICLE, THEY REMAIN LIABLE 
DIRECTLY TO SHAREHOLDERS FOR ANY BREACH OF 
THOSE FIDUCIARY DUTIES. 
By: David Feliciano 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, when corporate directors exercise duties that are non-managerial and outside the 
scope of section 2-405.l(a) of the Corporations and Associations 
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, they remain liable to 
shareholders for any breach of their fiduciary duties. Shenker v. 
Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 983 A.2d 408 (2009) (citing MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPs. & Ass'NS § 2-405.1 (a)). Therefore, when 
directors of Maryland corporations exercise the non-managerial duty 
of negotiating the value that shareholders will receive in a cash-out 
merger transaction, they owe to the shareholders the fiduciary 
common law duties of candor and maximization of shareholder value. 
Id. at 336,983 A.2d at 419. 
In June 2006, Chairman and CEO of Laureate Education, Inc. 
("Laureate"), Douglas Becker ("Becker"), proposed the idea of a cash-
out merger to Laureate's Board of Directors ("the Board"). On 
September 8, 2006, Becker informed the Board that he, along with 
several investors, intended to make an offer to purchase Laureate. The 
Board immediately created a special committee of disinterested 
directors to assess proposed offers. After Becker withdrew his first 
offer, the special committee unanimously recommended that the Board 
accept Becker's second offer. Becker's second offer price provided an 
11.1 % premium over Laureate's most recent stock trading price. On 
June 3,2007, Laureate further announced that it had accepted a "short-
form" merger where Becker and the other respondent investors could 
purchase up to one share above 90% of the total shares outstanding. 
Petitioner shareholders alleged that the Board: (1) failed to carry out a 
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suitable market check of Laureate's stock value; (2) issued a 
materially deceiving summary form of the tender offer; and (3) created 
an evaluation process that was riddled with conflict. 
The shareholders filed a direct lawsuit, rather than a derivative 
complaint, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging that the 
Board breached its fiduciary duties to the petitioners as shareholders, 
conspired to breach those duties, and aided and abetted that breach. 
The circuit court granted the Board's Motion to Dismiss, citing section 
2-405.1 (g) of the Corporations and Associations Article, which states 
that shareholders may not directly sue corporate directors for alleged 
violations of fiduciary duties. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed, holding that corporations do not owe a common 
law fiduciary duty directly to shareholders, and any shareholder claims 
must be raised in a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. 
Shenker petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which granted 
certiorari. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by addressing 
the legal sources of a corporate director's duties. Shenker, 411 Md. at 
335-36, 983 A.2d at 418-19. The Board contended that section 2-
405.1(a) is the only source of directorial duties. Id. at 339, 983 A.2d 
at 421. Specifically, section 2-405.1(a) states that directors must 
perform their managerial acts in good faith, reasonably in the best 
interest of the corporation, and with the care of an ordinarily prudent 
person under similar circumstances. Id. at 336, 983 A.2d at 419 
(citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.1(a)). The court, 
however, found that, beyond the duties of section 2-405 .1 (a), are the 
additional common law duties of candor and maximization of 
shareholder value. Id. at 337-38, 983 A.2d at 419-20. These two 
common law duties arise when a corporate director is negotiating the 
monetary amount that shareholders will receive in a cash-out merger 
transaction. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged that section 2-
405.1(a) governs a director's duty of care when making managerial 
decisions for the corporation itself. Id. at 338, 983 A.2d at 420. The 
court, however, identified that section 2-405.I(a) lacks guidance 
regarding a director's duty of care in non-managerial decisions. 
Shenker, 411 Md. at 338-39, 983 A.2d at 420. The court adopted its 
reasoning from Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
a landmark Delaware case. !d. at 338-39, 983 A.2d at 420-21 (citing 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986)). The court stated that, after making the threshold 
decision to sell the company, the director's role changes from that of 
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the manager of business affairs for the corporation to the negotiator of 
the highest possible price for the stockholders. Id. at 338-39,983 A.2d 
at 420-21 (citing Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182). It is this new role that 
instills in the director the fiduciary duties of finding the best value 
reasonably possible for stockholders and making complete disclosures 
of every important fact concerning the merger. Id. (citing Paramount 
Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48-49 (Del. 1994); 
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)). 
The court based the need for the common law fiduciary duties of 
candor and maximization of shareholder value on the following: (1) 
the confidence and trust placed in directors during negotiations; (2) a 
director's position to affect the finances of shareholders; and (3) the 
conflict of interest between directors and shareholders during a cash-
out merger. Id. at 339, 983 A.2d at 421 (citing Bennett, 187 A.2d at 
409). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the lower court's 
holding that section 2-405.1(a) supersedes all recognized common law 
duties that came before the adoption of the statute in 1976. Id. at 340-
41, 983 A.2d at 421-22. The court also disagreed with the Board's 
argument that section 2-405.1(f), a 1999 amendment to the statute, 
demonstrated the Maryland Legislature's intent to reject Revlon's 
reasoning. Shenker, 411 Md. at 340-41, 983 A.2d at 421-22. The 
court found that the amendment did not reject the duties characterized 
in Revlon because the basis for section 2-405.1 (f) and the basis for the 
holding in Revlon rely on different circumstances. Id. at 340-41, 983 
A.2d at 421-22. Section 2-405.1(f) sought to strengthen and protect a 
director's defense mechanisms against hostile takeover attempts, 
whereas the holding in Revlon involved circumstances where the sale 
of the corporation was inevitable, and the only shareholder interest 
remaining was to maximize the value of their shares. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also rejected the argument that 
the shareholders' action could only come in the form of a shareholder 
derivative suit. Id. at 346, 983 A.2d at 425. The court stated that, 
because the injury alleged by the shareholders was a breach of a duty 
that the Board owed directly to them, rather than to the corporation, 
the shareholders could bring a direct suit. Id. Additionally, the court 
affirmed the holding of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland that 
the shareholder's civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting complaints 
should be dismissed. Id. at 352-54, 983 A.2d at 428-30. 
With this holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has injected 
new life into the common law. The court doubled the avenues of legal 
relief available to corporate shareholders in the context of a cash-out 
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corporate merger transaction where the board of directors has already 
made the decision to sell the company. Attorneys for shareholders 
may now directly pursue common law claims against board members, 
in addition to statutory claims. Corporate shareholders are also not 
forced to seek relief through a shareholder derivative suit when they 
are directly harmed in a cash-out merger transaction. Practitioners 
should take note of the applicability of this opinion, as the court left 
open the possibility of expanding its holding outside of cash-out 
mergers, indicating that common law fiduciary duties of directors to 
shareholders can be triggered by other appropriate events. 
